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Abstract
We investigate the optimal R&D portfolio of a single-product mo-
nopolist investing in cost-reducing activities accompanied by eﬀorts
improving the quality of its product. There emerges that the ﬁrm’s
relative incentives along the two directions are conditional upon mar-
ket aﬄuency, measured by consumers’ willingness to pay for quality,
and R&D eﬀorts are complements at equilibrium. We also perform
the stability analysis, showing that a stable branch exists along the
quality dimension only.
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1 Introduction
The impact of monopoly power on product quality is a vexata quaestio in the
theory of industrial organization, at least since Spence (1975) and Mussa and
Rosen (1978), where the main issue under investigation is the ﬁrm’s tendency
to distort quality downwards to extract as much surplus as possible from con-
sumers’ pockets.1 This literature, however, (i) is based on static models, and
therefore by construction falls short of characterising the inherently dynamic
nature of quality improvement; (ii) leaves out of the picture any other form
of investments, such as any eﬀort directed at decreasing marginal produc-
tion costs, and ﬁnally (iii) disregards advertising activities (either persuasive
or informative) aimed at increasing demand or making the product more
appealing to consumers and thus convince them to pay higher prices for it.
Here, we propose a model addressing aspects (i) and (ii),2 leaving aside
(iii), which has generated a lively debate since the late 1970s, stemming from
the pioneering contribution of Kotowitz and Mathewson (1979).3 We charac-
terise the optimal R&D portfolio of a monopolist investing in cost-reducing
and quality improving activities while choosing the optimal output in a mar-
ket populated by consumers endowed with diﬀerent levels of willingness to
pay for quality. Our results can be summarised as follows. First, the ﬁrm
ﬁnds it optimal not to serve all consumers at equilibrium, pricing out the
poorest portion of consumers. Second, we single out the conditions ensur-
ing that both R&D eﬀorts be positive at equilibrium, and we also ﬁnd out
that the eﬀort directed at quality enhancement is higher than that reduc-
1This aspect has been largely debated: see Itoh (1983), Maskin and Riley (1984),
Besanko, Donnenfeld and White (1987), Champsaur and Rochet (1989) and Lambertini
and Orsini (2000), among others.
2The simultaneous presence of product and process innovations and their relation to
product life cycle in monopoly and oligopoly models is in Lambertini and Mantovani (2009,
2010), where a diﬀerent model is used, based on the representative consumer approach as
in Singh and Vives (1984).
3The bulk of the resulting literature is summarised in Feichtinger et al. (1994). For a
later contribution in this vein, see Colombo and Lambertini (2003).
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ing marginal production cost if the market is aﬄuent enough. Third, our
analysis reveals that the two types of R&D are complements at the steady
state equilibrium. As a corollary to the main body of the analysis, the wel-
fare assessment shows that the ﬁrm distorts quality downwards as compared
to social eﬃciency. Finally, we also carry out the stability analysis, showing
that the steady state equilibrium is a degenerate saddle point, with the stable
branch emerging on the quality improvement side of the model.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates
the setup. The equilibrium analysis is carried out in Section 3, while Section
4 contains the stability analysis. Concluding remarks are in Section 5.
2 The model
Our model is a variation on the setup introduced by Mussa and Rosen (1978)
and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979). We assume the market is supplied by
a single-product monopoly selling a nondurable good of quality q (t) > 0 at
price p (t) > 0 over continuous time t ∈ [0,∞) . The population of consumers
is of constant size Θ > 0, and each consumer is characterised by a level
of marginal willingness to pay for quality θ ∈ [0,Θ] . Parameter θ can be
interpreted as a proxy of income or wealth.4 The mass of consumers is
uniformly distributed with density 1 over such interval. At any time t ∈
[0,∞) , each individual is assumed to buy a single unit of the good or nothing
at all, whereby his net surplus is
U = θq (t)− p (t) ≥ 0 (1)
if he buys, otherwise it is nil. The consumer indiﬀerent between buying or not
is indexed by θ = p (t) /q (t) ; accordingly, the instantaneous inverse demand
function is
p (t) = [Θ− x (t)] q (t) . (2)
4A similar although not entirely equivalent and less frequent approach consists in mod-
elling consumer preferences by describing explicitly their income distribution. See Shaked
and Sutton (1982), inter alia.
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On the supply side, the instantaneous cost function borne by the ﬁrm is5
C (t) = c (t) x (t) + bk2 (t) + sy2 (t) (3)
where b and s are positive parameters and c (t) is the marginal production
cost of output, which can be decreased (generating thus what is usually de-
ﬁned as process innovation) via an R&D eﬀort y (t) . The remaining variable
k (t) measures the instantaneous eﬀort for product innovation (or quality
improvement), increasing the level of q (t) . The resulting state dynamics de-
scribing the evolution of c (t) and q (t) over time are
dq (t)
dt
≡ ·q = k (t)− δc (t) (4)
dc (t)
dt
≡ ·c = −y (t) + ηc (t) (5)
in which δ > 0 is the decay rate of product quality while η > 0 is the
obsolescence rate aﬀecting production technology.
The monopolist’s instantaneous proﬁts are
π (t) = p (t) x (t)− C (t) = (6)
[(Θ− x (t)) q (t)− c (t)] x (t)− bk2 (t) + sy2 (t)
and the ﬁrm wants to maximise the discounted proﬁt ﬂow
Π(t) =

∞
0
π (t) e−ρtdt (7)
w.r.t. controls x (t) , k (t) and y (t) ,6 under the constraints posed by the state
equations (4-5), initial conditions q (0) = q0 > 0, c (0) = c0 ∈ (0,Θq (0)) , and
5We are assuming that the entire R&D activity is carried out in house by the integrated
ﬁrm. For an assessment of the bearings of outsourcing on quality improvement, and the
related contractual design, see El Ouardighi and Kim (2010) and El Ouardighi and Kogan
(2013), inter alia.
6The alternative between price-setting and quantity-setting behaviour is of course im-
material in a monopoly model, as can be quickly checked.
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the appropriate transversality conditions to be speciﬁed below. It is worth
observing that the initial condition on marginal cost says that it must be
strictly lower than the spending capability of the richest consumer existing
in this market, in order for demand to be positive at all times. Proﬁts are
discounted at the constant rate ρ > 0.
3 Equilibrium analysis
The ﬁrm’s current value Hamiltonian is7
H = e−ρt

π + λ
·
q + µ
·
c

(8)
where λ = ζeρt and µ = ψeρt are the costate variables (evaluated at time
t) associated with q and c, respectively. The resulting ﬁrst order conditions
(FOCs) on controls and costate equations are (exponential discounting is
omitted for brevity):
∂H
∂x
= (Θ− 2x) q − c = 0 (9)
∂H
∂k
= −2bk + λ = 0 (10)
∂H
∂y
= −2sy − µ = 0 (11)
·
λ = −∂H
∂q
+ ρλ⇔ (12)
·
λ = (δ + ρ)λ− x (Θ− x)
·
µ = −∂H
∂c
+ ρµ⇔ (13)
·
µ = (ρ− η)µ+ x.
The accompanying set of transversality conditions is limt→∞ λqe
−ρt = 0 and
limt→∞ µce
−ρt = 0.
7Henceforth, we shall omit the explicit indication of the time argument for the sake of
brevity.
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The FOC (9) can be solved in a quasi-static way to obtain the optimal
instantaneous output x∗ = (Θq − c) / (2q) , so that monopoly price is p∗ =
(Θq + c) /2. Before proceeding, we may formulate
Lemma 1 For any given admissible pair of states (q, c), optimal output x∗ ∈
(0,Θ) .
Proof. To prove the Lemma, it suﬃces to observe that x∗ ∈ (0,Θ) iﬀ
p∗/q ∈ (0,Θ) , with p∗/q = (Θq + c) / (2q) andΘ−p∗/q = (Θq − c) / (2q) > 0
always, since Θq > p∗ > c in order to enable the richest consumer to buy,
either at the monopoly price or, a fortiori, at a competitive price equal to
marginal cost.
From (10-11), we have
λ = 2bk ; µ = −2sy (14)
and the control equations
·
k =
·
λ
2b
;
·
y = −
·
µ
2s
(15)
which, using (12-14), can be rewritten as follows:
·
k =
c2 + [8bk (δ + ρ)−Θ2] q2
8bq2
(16)
·
y =
c+ [4sy (ρ− η)−Θ] q
4sq
(17)
The system composed by (4-5) and (16-17) identiﬁes the state-control system
of the dynamic problem at hand. Nowwe proceed as follows. First, we impose
stationarity on controls, whereby

·
k = 0,
·
y = 0

yields
k∗ =
Θ2q2 − c2
8bq2 (δ + ρ)
(18)
y∗ =
Θq − c
4sq (ρ− η) (19)
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Note that, since Θ2q2 − c2 = (Θq − c) (Θq + c) and Θq − c > 0 necessarily,
as it must be Θq > p > c, then k∗ is strictly positive, for any admissible
levels of states q and c. As to y∗, this is positive iﬀ ρ > η, i.e., iﬀ the ﬁrm’s
impatience outweighs the rate of depreciation of technology. Therefore, in
the remainder, we shall assume ρ > η. Now, given q and c, we can compare
k∗ and y∗, to see that
k∗ − y∗ = Θq − c
4q
· (Θq + c) s (ρ− η)− 2bq (δ + ρ)
2bsq (δ + ρ) (ρ− η) > 0 (20)
for all
Θ >
2bq (δ + ρ)− sc (ρ− η)
s (ρ− η) q ≡ Θky (21)
Relying on the above expression and Lemma 1, we can claim the following:
Proposition 2 Take ρ > η > 0. For any given admissible pair of states
(q, c) , condition Θ > max {Θky, c/q} suﬃces to ensure k∗ > y∗ > 0.
Proposition 2 conveys the intuitive message that the equilibrium R&D
eﬀort for quality improvement is higher than the eﬀort exerted for process
innovation if the marginal willingness to pay for quality of the richest con-
sumer in the market is high enough (or, equivalently, if consumers’ aﬄuency
is suﬃciently high): richer consumers with hedonic tastes are keen on paying
higher prices for superior quality levels notwithstanding that the good they
are buying is being produced at a comparatively higher marginal cost, and
the ﬁrm is happy to react accordingly along the two R&D dimensions.
A supplementary discussion can be carried out about the presence of
complementarity or substitutability between the two forms of innovation, in
line with an existing discussion in the literature (see Lambertini, 2003, 2004;
and Lin, 2004, inter alia). At ﬁrst sight, judging from (18-19), one would
be tempted to conclude that, in the present model, product and process
innovation are independent of each other, as ∂k∗/∂y∗ = ∂y∗/∂k∗ = 0.
This conclusion, however, in addition to being at odds with the acquired
wisdom on R&D portfolios inherited from the theory of industrial organiza-
tion (cf. Bhattacharya and Mookherjee, 1986; and Dasgupta and Maskin,
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1987), predicting some form of interplay but not independence, can be swept
away by observing that both states appear in (18-19), and therefore one can
carry out a simple exercise to single out the nature of the inﬂuence exerted
by one type of innovation on the other. This can be done by observing that
∂k∗
∂y∗
=
∂k∗
∂q
· ∂q
∂y∗
=
∂k∗/∂q
∂y∗/∂q
(22)
where ∂k∗/∂q = c2/ [4bq3 (δ + ρ)] > 0 and ∂y∗/∂q = c/ [4sq2 (ρ− η)] > 0
and therefore
∂k∗
∂y∗
=
∂k∗/∂q
∂y∗/∂q
=
sc (ρ− η)
bq (δ + ρ)
> 0 (23)
for all ρ > η. Analogously,
∂y∗
∂k∗
=
∂y∗
∂c
· ∂c
∂k∗
=
∂y∗/∂c
∂k∗/∂c
(24)
where ∂y∗/∂c = −1/ [4sq (ρ− η)] < 0 and ∂k∗/∂c = −c/ [4bq2 (δ + ρ)] < 0
and therefore, once again
∂y∗
∂k∗
=
1
∂k∗/∂y∗
=
bq (δ + ρ)
sc (ρ− η) > 0 (25)
for all ρ > η. This analysis can be summarised in
Lemma 3 Process and product innovation are complements in the neigh-
bourhood of equilibrium.
That is, provided both eﬀorts are positive, each one boosts the other in
the neighbourhood of the steady state, thereby fostering the global innovative
content of the monopolist’s product. The intuitive explanation of this result
is that any reduction in c and any increase in q increase the proﬁtability of
the ﬁrm. The ﬁrst implication is obvious as a lower marginal cost produces a
higher proﬁt margin, all else equal; the second can be understood noting that
higher quality levels expand the gross spending capability (measured by the
product θq) of any consumer, and therefore contribute to expanding sales by
attracting additional consumers that would be unwilling to purchase lower
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qualities. In a nutshell, any additional eﬀort in either direction increases
gross proﬁts, thereby making available additional funds to ﬁnance the other
R&D dimension.8
We can now proceed to impose stationarity on (5), which delivers the
following steady state value of marginal cost:
c∗ =
Θq
1 + 4sq (ρ− η) η (26)
There remains to identify the steady state level of quality. To this aim, we
have to impose stationarity on (4), which now writes as follows:
·
q =
Θ2s (ρ− η) ηq [1 + 2sq (ρ− η) η]
b (ρ+ δ) [1 + 4sq (ρ− η) η]2 − δq. (27)
For future reference, note that the r.h.s. of the above equation is discontin-
uous in correspondence of
q = − 1
4s (ρ− η) η ≡ q < 0. (28)
Solving
·
q = 0, we obtain three roots, q = 0 and
q± =
−4bδ (δ + ρ) + Θ

Θs (ρ− η) η ±√ΓΨ
	
16bsδ (δ + ρ) (ρ− η) η (29)
with Γ ≡ s (ρ− η) η and Ψ ≡ Θ2s (ρ− η) η + 8bδ (δ + ρ) . Note that q± ∈ R
and q− < −1/ [4s (ρ− η) η] in the whole admissible range of parameters, as
it can be easily ascertained. Additionally, q = 0 is economically inadmissible,
as it would imply that all consumers would be unwilling (as well as unable) to
buy the good at any positive price. Hence, we are left with a single candidate,
q∗ = q+ > 0 for all
Θ >


b (δ + ρ) δ
s (ρ− η) η ≡ Θq > 0. (30)
8The same can be shown to apply at any t, using (10-13). The related calculations are
omitted for brevity.
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Likewise, it can be easily established that k∗, y∗, x∗ and π∗ are positive iﬀ
Θ > Θq. The above expression must be evaluated against (21), which now
can be rewritten as follows:
Θky =
2bη (δ + ρ)− sδ (ρ− η)
s (ρ− η) η > 0 (31)
for all b > sδ (ρ− η) / [2η (δ + ρ)] ≡ b, with
Θky > Θq ∀ b > sδ (ρ− η)
(δ + ρ) η
≡ b
Θky ∈ (0,Θq) ∀ b ∈

0, b

.
(32)
The foregoing discussion can be summarised in the following Figures 1-2.
Figure 1 portrays the case Θ > Θq. In this range, the dynamics of q, illus-
trated by the horizontal arrows, shows that q+ is not only positive but also
stable. The vertical dashed line indicates the discountinuity at q.
Figure 1: Dynamics of q, Θ > Θq.


 
·
q
qq
The alternative situation occurring in the parameter range identiﬁed by
Θ ∈ (0,Θq) can be disregarded as it is not economically meaningful: in this
case, indeed, product quality drops to zero at the steady state equilibrium,
which also involves that sales are nil since consumers are unwilling to buy.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium analysis in the space {b,Θ}.
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Figure 2 oﬀers a partition of the parameter space {b,Θ} in which one can
appreciate the bearings of market aﬄuency and the steepness of R&D costs
for product innovation on product quality and the relative weights of process
and product innovation at the steady state equilibrium.
Looking at Figure 2, we must restrict our attention to the region deﬁned
by Θ > Θq, since below the curve Θq all equilibrium magnitudes are negative.
We can formulate the following:
Proposition 4 Take ρ > η > 0, and consider the range Θ > Θq:
• in area I, Θ > max {Θq,Θky} . Here, q∗ = q+ > 0 and k∗ > y∗;
• in area II, Θ ∈ (Θq,Θky) . Here, q∗ = q+ > 0 but k∗ < y∗.
The second claim appearing in the above Proposition says that, for in-
termediate levels of Θ, although equilibrium quality is positive, the level of
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the richest consumer’s marginal willingness to pay is low enough to modify
the R&D portfolio of the ﬁrm in such a way that it ﬁnds convenient to put
a higher eﬀort in process rather than in product innovation.
To complement the analysis, one can look at the welfare consequences
of the ﬁrm’s decision. Deﬁne social welfare as SW = π + CS, with CS = Θ
p/q
(θq − p) dθ measusing consumer surplus. Now use (18-19) and (26) to
write
CS (c∗, y∗, k∗) =
2s2q3 (ρ− η)2 η2Θ2
[1 + 4sq (ρ− η) η]2 (33)
In correspondence of q∗, proﬁt is maximised and therefore, if (33) is monotone
w.r.t. q, then monopoly quality is necessarily socially ineﬃcient in either way.
It can be easily veriﬁed that (33) is monotonically increasing in q, which
implies that the ﬁrm undersupplies product quality. This reproduces in a
dynamic setup a result dating back to Spence (1975) and Mussa and Rosen
(1978).
4 Stability analysis
The properties of the state-control system consisting of (4-5) and (16-17)
must be assessed by evaluating the eigenvalues of the following 4×4 Jacobian
matrix:
J =

∂
·
c
∂c
∂
·
c
∂q
∂
·
c
∂y
∂
·
c
∂k
∂
·
q
∂c
∂
·
q
∂q
∂
·
q
∂y
∂
·
q
∂k
∂
·
y
∂c
∂
·
y
∂q
∂
·
y
∂y
∂
·
y
∂k
∂
·
k
∂c
∂
·
k
∂q
∂
·
k
∂y
∂
·
k
∂k

= (34)
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
η 0 −1 0
0 −δ 0 1
1
4sq
− c
4sq2
ρ− η 0
c
4bq2
− c
2
4bq3
0 δ + ρ

in correspondence of the equilibrium vector {c∗, q∗, y∗, k∗}. The analyti-
cal derivation of the eigenvalues, although possible, does not allow for a
straightforward assessment of their signs as the resulting expressions are
cumbersome. However, using admissible paremeter values, such as Θ = 10,
b = s = 1/2, δ = η = 1/20 and ρ = 1/15, the eigenvalues can be computed
numerically:
λ1 = 0.1156, λ2 = −0.0489,
λ3 = 0.0458, λ4 = 0.0208
(35)
The above list implies that {c∗, q∗, y∗, k∗} is a saddle point, although a de-
generate one, as it can be reached only along the branch describing the dy-
namic relation between quality q and the product innovation control k.9 This
property can be better appreciated by splitting the stability analysis in two
separate steps, each one being related to a speciﬁc state-control plane, either
{c, y} or {q, k} . In the ﬁrst case, the state-control system is (5-17), whose
Jacobian matrix is characterised by the following trace and determinant:
T (c, y) = ρ > 0 ; ∆ (c, y) = 1
4sq
+ η (ρ− η) > 0 (36)
which implies instability. In the second case, the Jacobian matrix of (4-16)
is instead characterised by
T (q, k) = ρ > 0 ; ∆ (q, k) = c
2
4bq2
− δ (δ + ρ) (37)
with ∆(q, k) < 0 for all q > 3

c2/ [4bδ (δ + ρ)] ≡ q, with q∗ > q
c=c∗
∀Θ >
Θq . Accordingly, in the state-control plane {q, k} we have a saddle point
9For an analogous result in a diﬀerent problem concerning a diﬀerential oligopoly game,
see Dragone et al. (2013, pp. 173-75).
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equilibrium for all Θ > Θq, i.e., in the portion of the parameter space wherein
q∗ is positive and k∗ > y∗.
5 Concluding remarks
We have characterised the optimal R&D portfolio of a monopolist, showing
that product improvement may indeed prevail over process innovation, if the
market is suﬃciently rich. When both R&D eﬀorts are positive, then at
equilibrium they are complements, boosting each other. Equilibrium quality
falls short of the socially eﬃcient level.
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